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 THESE TATS ARE MADE FOR TALKING:  WHY 
TATTOOS AND TATTOOING ARE PROTECTED 
SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
“The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the 
human spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression.” 
- Thurgood Marshall in Procunier v. Martinez1 
 
This Comment examines the current split among the federal circuit 
courts of appeal on the issue of First Amendment protection of tattoos and 
argues for the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari to Ander-
son v. City of Hermosa Beach and adopt the approach taken by the Ninth 
Circuit Court.  Traditionally, courts have viewed a restriction on the proc-
ess of creating pure speech as a restriction on the speech itself.  As a result, 
the courts vigorously protect the process of creating the speech.  Tattooing, 
a process inexplicably linked to the creation of tattoos, must be protected 
with the same fervor as the process that creates any other pure speech.  
Subsequently, zoning laws restricting tattoo establishments would be exam-
ined under stricter constitutional standards leading to greater freedom of 
expression. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Tattoos, lifelong commitments to particular expressions, have become 
pervasive in modern society.2  For most, the choice to get a tattoo is not a 
rash decision but the result of thorough contemplation—the desire to make 
“permanent that which is fleeting.”3  Tattoos can mark rites of passage, ex-
press feelings about others, show religious devotion, or symbolize a collec-
                                                           
1.  Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
2.  See Susan Benson, Inscriptions of the Self:  Reflections on Tattooing and Piercing in 
Contemporary Euro-America, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY:  THE TATTOO IN EUROPEAN AND 
AMERICAN HISTORY 234, 240 (Jane Caplan ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2000) (explaining that in 
recent years the “tattoo community” has become more organized, visible, and numerous); see also 
Tattoos Leave Mark on Ads, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2007, at C8 (asserting that two out of every 
five Americans between the ages of 26 and 40 have tattoos, reducing the edginess of tattoos and 
thus making them less effective marketing tools). 
3.  Chris Hedges, Wearing Their Hearts Under Their Sleeves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1990, 
at B3 (quoting Dr. Gerald W. Grumet on the psychodynamics of tattoos).  
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tion of significant moments in one’s life.4  Whereas tattoos were previously 
viewed as the “seedy province of old salts, sideshow freaks and biker[s,]” 
today, tattoos have firmly planted themselves within mainstream society.5 
In part, the widespread popularity of tattoos is attributed to both tech-
nological advances in the field and refined artistic techniques developed by 
tattoo artists.6  New machinery and ink formulations have allowed artists to 
create detailed tattoos with “thinner lines and more vibrant colors.”7  Fur-
thermore, many tattoo artists are art school graduates who create “sophisti-
cated, colorful graphic designs,” which sometimes take more than thirty-six 
hours to complete.8  Moreover, advancements such as autoclave steriliza-
tion and similar tattooing techniques make tattooing safer by preventing the 
spread of communicable diseases, such as Hepatitis B.9  These advances 
have transformed the industry from that of a dark and unwieldy subculture 
to a mainstream art form in which the general public desires the creation of 
a variety of unique images.10  Despite society’s general recognition of tat-
toos and tattooing as forms of art, most courts deny tattoos’ artistic merit, 
and thus refrain from awarding tattoos and tattooing the full protection af-
forded other art forms under the First Amendment.11 
The issue of First Amendment protection for tattoos and tattooing has 
recently taken center stage in California’s legal arena.12  California, like all 
other states within the United States, permits the establishment of tattoo 
                                                           
4.  Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010); Hedges, su-
pra note 3, at B3.   
5.  See Michael Kimmelman, Tattoo Moves from Fringes to Fashion.  But Is It Art?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1995, at C1 (asserting that today more middle-class teenagers and adults are get-
ting tattoos).   
6.  Id. 
7.  Aurora Mackey, Say It with Skin, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1992, at J8.  
8.  Steve Rhodes, Their Fans Know the Beauty of Tattoos Not Just Skin-Deep, CHI. TRIB., 
Sept. 18, 1993, at N5. 
9.  Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (D. Minn. 1980). 
10.  See Rhodes, supra note 8, at N5 (describing Jim Barron’s technicolor outdoor scenes); 
see also Richard Abowitz, Tattoo Trendiness Has the Strip Awash in Ink, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 
2009, at D10 (stating that for thirty years, tattoo artists have tried to go mainstream and that it has 
finally happened). 
11.  See State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 423 (S.C. 2002) (responding to the dissent’s 
proposition that tattooing is equivalent to painting, writing, or sculpting, the court asserts that tat-
tooing is “unique in that it involves invasion of human tissue and, therefore, may be subject to 
state regulation to which other art forms (on non-human mediums) may not be lawfully sub-
jected”); see also Kimmelman, supra note 5, at C1 (stating that art galleries have begun to exhibit 
shows of tattoo designs, such as “Pierced Hearts and True Love:  A Century of Drawings for Tat-
toos”). 
12.  See Marcel Honoré & Colin Atagi, Ruling May Affect Cities’ Policies on Tattoo Par-
lors, DESERT SUN, Sept. 10, 2010, at A1 (discussing the impact of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach). 
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parlors.13  However, in order to protect its citizens from communicable dis-
eases, each state places different regulations upon the practice of tattoo-
ing.14  In California, tattoo artists must register with the county health de-
partment.15  The County of Los Angeles permits tattooing; however, the 
City of Hermosa Beach, a city within Los Angeles County, legislated a 
complete ban on tattooing within its city limits.16  The City of Hermosa 
Beach ordinance provides that, “[e]xcept as provided in this title, no . . . 
building or land [shall] be used for any purpose except as hereinafter spe-
cifically provided . . . .”17  The ordinance does not name tattooing in the list 
of permitted uses.18  However, upon request, the community development 
director may grant a similar use permit by finding that the proposed “com-
mercial use not listed in the zoning code . . . ‘is similar to and not more ob-
jection[able] than other uses listed.’”19   
In May 2007, Johnny Anderson, a co-owner of a tattoo shop in the 
City of Los Angeles, attempted to have his plans for a tattoo parlor ap-
proved for a similar use permit by the City of Hermosa Beach community 
development director.20  Anderson’s request was denied, and he was pre-
vented from establishing a tattoo parlor in the City of Hermosa Beach.21  
Subsequently, Anderson brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the 
City.22  He petitioned that the zoning ordinance was facially unconstitu-
tional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief.23  
Anderson’s relief was dependent on whether the court found that tat-
toos and tattooing fell under the protection of the First Amendment.24  The 
district court denied this protection because it found that tattooing was not 
“‘sufficiently imbued with the elements of communication[.]’”25  The court 
                                                           
13.  Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1065. 
14.  Id. 
15.  Id. at 1056  
16.  Id. at 1056–57. 
17.  Id. at 1057. 
18.  Id.  
19.  Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1057. 
20.  Id. at 1055, 1057. 
21.  Id. at 1057. 
22.  See id. at 1057–58 (explaining the procedural history of the case and Anderson’s suit 
against the City of Hermosa Beach under Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights or 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983). 
23.  Id. at 1057. 
24.  Id. at 1055. 
25.  Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 
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opined that since “the customer has ultimate control over which design she 
wants tattooed on her skin” the tattoo artist is not conveying the artist’s 
own message or idea to others.26  As a result, the district court applied a ra-
tional basis test to the zoning law and upheld the ordinance as a rational 
means of preventing the alleged health risks of tattooing.27  However, when 
Anderson appealed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that tattoos 
and the associated process and business of tattooing are purely expressive 
activities that are fully protected under the First Amendment.28  Under the 
stricter test applied to zoning laws that infringe upon protected speech, the 
zoning ordinance was declared unconstitutional.29 
This Comment addresses the historic denial of First Amendment pro-
tection to tattoos and tattooing that has resulted in a complete ban of tattoo 
parlors in certain cities.  Part II of this Comment addresses how courts have 
incorrectly interpreted tattoos under the First Amendment.  Part III explains 
that tattoos and tattooing are entitled to full First Amendment protection 
because:  (1) tattoos are pure speech; (2) pure speech is fully protected un-
der the First Amendment; (3) the process of tattooing is inextricably inter-
twined with the creation of the tattoo and thus must be fully protected as 
well; and (4) if viewed separately from the tattoo, the process of tattooing 
is an expressive activity, in and of itself.  Part IV of this Comment urges 
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to Anderson v. City of Hermosa 
Beach to resolve a circuit conflict and to affirm the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion.  Finally, Part V describes how a grant of First Amendment protection 
to tattooing would potentially affect anti-tattooing zoning laws. 
II.  COURTS HAVE PERMITTED MUNICIPALITIES TO CONSTRUCTIVELY BAN 
TATTOO PARLORS BY HOLDING THAT THE PROCESS OF TATTOOING IS 
NOT PROTECTED UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
A.  Historically Courts Have Upheld Zoning Laws Forbidding or Severely 
Restricting the Establishment of Tattoo Parlors  
Despite the widespread popularity and influence tattoos have garnered 
in the last few decades,30 some lawmakers still view tattooing as a “bar-
                                                                                                                                        
(1974)). 
26.  Id.  
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. at 1060. 
29.  See id. at 1055 (holding that a total ban on tattooing is not a reasonable “time, place, or 
manner” restriction).  
30.  See Kyra Kyles, Body of Art, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 28, 2006, Redeye, at 6 (referring to the 
popularity of shows like Inked and Miami Ink).  
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baric” activity desired by those of “morbid or abnormal personalit[ies.]”31  
As a result, some cities have banned the establishment of tattoo parlors 
within their limits suggesting that the “health, safety and general welfare” 
of its citizens warrants protection from this grotesque activity.32   
Cities attempt to prevent the establishment of tattoo shops in a variety 
of ways.  Some cities completely prohibit tattoo parlors.33  For example, 
three Coachella Valley cities in California enacted outright bans on the op-
eration of tattoo parlors.34  Other places restrict the establishment of tattoo 
parlors only in certain areas within a municipality.35  Finally, some cities 
prohibit “tattooing of human beings except by licensed medical doctors for 
medical purposes. . . .”36  These localities justify the enactment of their re-
spective ordinances by citing the health and safety of their citizens while 
also alluding to the “unsavory clientele prone to crime” that the localities 
perceive tattoo shops attract.37   
Anti-tattoo zoning laws have garnered support from courts that find 
complete or area- specific bans on tattooing constitutional.38  Courts reason 
that tattooing is dangerous because it involves “puncturing the skin” with a 
needle creating openings in the human skin through which diseases can 
pass.39  As a result, any regulation restricting a person’s ability to tattoo 
bears a significant relationship to the state’s police power.40  Unfortunately, 
these courts fail to consider the fact that prohibiting legal tattoo parlors 
                                                           
31.  People v. O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (N.Y. App. Term 1978) (quoting Gross-
man v. Baumgartner, 254 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964)). 
32.  See id. (holding that the “right to engage in tattooing is not paramount to the public’s 
right to good health.”). 
33.  See, e.g., Jake Remaly, Chatham Weighing Tattoo Parlor Limits, DAILY REC. (New 
Jersey), Aug. 12, 2009 (noting that Chatham, New Jersey had a complete ban on tattooing); Gary 
Nelson, Mesa Council Ponders Zoning Changes Aimed at Low-End Businesses, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Feb. 5, 2010, at 7 (noting that in Mesa, Arizona, tattoo and body piercing shops are required to 
have a council use permit to establish businesses). 
34.  See Honoré & Atagi, supra note 12, at A1 (listing that Desert Hot Springs, Indian 
Wells, and Rancho Mirage ban tattoo parlors).  
35.  See Amy Picard, Art-4-Long?, NEWARK ADVOC. (Ohio), Apr. 24, 2008, at A1 (declar-
ing that tattoo shops were not allowed in a neighborhood business district because the zoning 
laws only allowed for services that residents would need on a day-to-day basis). 
36.  O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 333. 
37.  See Honoré & Atagi, supra note 12, at A1. 
38.  See State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 424 (S.C. 2002) (applying a rational basis test af-
ter concluding that tattooing is not constitutionally protected conduct under the First Amend-
ment). 
39.  Golden v. McCarty, 337 So. 2d 388, 390 (Fla. 1976). 
40.  Id. 
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within city limits pushes tattoo parlors underground.41  Consequently, the 
risks associated with tattooing become harder to regulate since there can be 
no state-funded agency to monitor tattoo shops’ compliance with sterile tat-
tooing conditions.42 
B.  Some Courts Deny First Amendment Protection to Tattooing   
Many tattoo artists have attempted to challenge anti-tattooing zoning 
laws by arguing that these zoning laws are a restriction on their First 
Amendment rights.43  However, courts have denied the process of tattooing 
First Amendment protection, thus allowing zoning laws to ban tattoo par-
lors.44  Three basic mistakes support the denial of First Amendment protec-
tion to tattooing:  (1) tattoos are not pure speech, (2) tattoos and the process 
of tattooing are viewed as separate expressions, and (3) the process of tat-
tooing is devoid of any expression.45 
1.  Past Courts Have Not Found that Tattoos Are Pure Speech  
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prevents the federal 
government from implementing laws that infringe upon a person’s right to 
free speech.46  The Fourteenth Amendment, which applies the protections 
listed in the Bill of Rights to state government actions, prohibits the states 
from creating laws that abridge the free expression of ideas.47  When devis-
                                                           
41.  See James V. O’Connor, Tattooing:  More Female Clients Enter a Formerly Male 
Realm, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, § 13 (Westchester Wkly.) at 1 (noting that Becky Shaffner got 
a tattoo from an illegal parlor in Manhattan since tattoo parlors are illegal in New York City).  
42.  See State ex rel. Crabtree v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Health, 673 N.E.2d 1281, 1283–84 
(Ohio 1997) (supporting the state’s assertion that banning tattoo parlors would drive the estab-
lishments underground and would thus prevent government regulation of sterile equipment in 
legal tattoo shops).  
43.  See Bobby G. Frederick, Note, Tattoos and the First Amendment—Art Should Be Pro-
tected as Art:  The South Carolina Supreme Court Upholds the State’s Ban on Tattooing, 55 S. C. 
L. REV. 231, 234–36 (2003) (illustrating an overview of certain cases where petitioners sought 
relief from anti-tattooing zoning laws:  Grossman v. Baumgartner, 218 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y. 1966), 
Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1980), and State v. Brady, 492 N.E.2d 34 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1986)). 
44.  See Blue Horseshoe Tattoo, V, Ltd. v. City of Norfolk, 2007 WL 6002098, at *2 (Va. 
Cir. Ct. 2007) (stating that in the city’s brief, the city cited numerous federal and state court cases 
supporting the allegation that tattooing is not constitutionally protected speech). 
45.  See id. (summarizing past laws on tattoos and tattooing and finding that tattoos are not 
protected expressions under the First Amendment and that tattooing is not sufficiently communi-
cative in nature to be encompassed by the First Amendment).   
46.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from making a “law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech”). 
47.  Anthony Jude Picchione, Note, Tat-Too Bad for Municipalities:  Unconstitutional 
Zoning of Body-Art Establishments, 84 B.U. L. REV. 829, 834 (2004). 
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ing the Constitution, the Framers sought to ensure that Americans could 
communicate freely about their country, their government, and its laws.48  
Laws regulating the free expression of ideas are subjected to strict scrutiny 
to prevent chilling constitutionally protected speech.49   
When deciding First Amendment cases, courts are especially careful 
to protect pure speech.50  Pure speech is the term used for ideas expressed 
verbally or through written words.51  In order to achieve the status of pure 
speech, the speech must be “relatively pure[,]” consisting mainly of verbal 
and written utterances as opposed to conduct.52  For example, picketing is 
not pure speech since it involves conduct that can convey a message absent 
the spoken or written word.53  On the other hand, a newspaper qualifies as 
pure speech because it consists of words and images absent any conduct.54  
The Supreme Court believes the protection of pure speech is of the utmost 
importance because even though speech “is often provocative and challeng-
ing . . . [t]here is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive 
view [because] the alternative would lead to the standardization of ideas 
either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.”55  
Despite the similarities between tattoos and the words and images in 
newspapers, many courts refuse to acknowledge that tattoos are pure 
speech entitled to full protection under the First Amendment.56  In Riggs v. 
City of Fort Worth, the court held that a tattoo is simply a way for a person 
to express personal views and beliefs.57  The court stated that protected 
speech must address a legitimate public concern and that the tattoo at is-
sue—a Celtic design of the plaintiff’s heritage—was not of concern to the 
                                                           
48.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1206 (3d ed. 2009) (noting that the 
First Amendment was intended to protect against common law sedition laws and prevent prosecu-
tion for speaking out against the government). 
49.  See id. at 1248 (emphasizing the importance of avoiding vagueness in laws restricting 
free speech so as to avoid chilling speech). 
50.  See Picchione, supra note 47, at 834 (stating that pure speech is of the highest con-
cern). 
51.  John P. Collins, Jr., Note, Speaking in Code, 106 YALE L.J. 2691, 2694 (1997).   
52.  Id.  
53.  Id. 
54.  See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755 (1988) (holding 
that there is “explicit protection” for speech and the press in the text of the First Amendment).  
55.  Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 
1, 4–5 (1949)).   
56.  Riggs v. City of Fort Worth, 229 F. Supp. 2d 572, 580 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (stating that a 
police officer’s tattoo was not protected under the First Amendment right of free speech).  
57.  Id. at 580 n.11. 
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public.58  Likewise, in Stephenson v. Davenport Community School Dis-
trict, the Eighth Circuit declared that the tattoo at issue—a small cross be-
tween the thumb and index finger—was “simply ‘a form of self-
expression’” not protected by the First Amendment.59  In conclusion, some 
courts refuse to grant tattoos protection under the First Amendment be-
cause they view tattoos as self-expression.60  To these courts, only expres-
sion or conduct that addresses issues of public concern are protected under 
the First Amendment.61   
2.  Courts Analyze the Process of Tattooing Separately from the Tattoo  
When determining if the process of tattooing is entitled to First 
Amendment protection, some courts look at the product separately from the 
process.62  For example, in Yurkew v. Sinclair, the court argued “that the 
issue of whether certain conduct comes within the protection of the First 
Amendment should not invariably depend on whether the final product of 
the conduct can by some stretch of the imagination be characterized as art 
or an art form.”63  Then, the court held that even if a tattoo was an art form 
entitled to First Amendment protection, such protection did not extend to 
the process of tattooing.64  The court reasoned that a tattoo was clearly 
more communicative than the process.65  Likewise, the court in Hold Fast 
Tattoo v. City of North Chicago found that the process of tattooing is “one 
step removed” from the expressive tattoo and thus not entitled to First 
Amendment protection.66   
                                                           
58.  Id. 
59.  Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1305, 1307 n.4 (8th Cir. 
1997). 
60.  Id. at 1307 n.4. 
61.  See id. (stating that Plaintiff’s tattoo is a mere self-expression and not in the same 
category as wearing an armband in protest of the Vietnam War); see also Riggs, 229 F. Supp. 2d 
572 at 581 n.11 (relegating the Plaintiff’s tattoo to simply his own personal views and beliefs and 
not speech about “legitimate public concern”).   
62.  See Yurkew, 495 F. Supp. at 1254 (arguing that even if a tattoo was entitled to First 
Amendment protection, the process of creating a tattoo is not).  
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. 
66.  Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago, 580 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660 (N.D. Ill. 
2008). 
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3.  Separated from the Product, the Process of Tattooing Is Viewed by the 
Courts as Not Expressive Enough to Be Entitled to First Amendment 
Protection  
Courts have not limited First Amendment protection to just pure 
speech but have also provided protection to sufficiently communicative 
conduct.67  In Spence v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held 
that conduct is “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication” 
when there is “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message,” and “the 
likelihood [is] great that the message would be understood by those who 
view[] it.”68  The Spence test was created to avoid awarding First Amend-
ment protection to a limitless list of conduct, as doing so would make legis-
lation almost impossible.69  For example, a person walking down the street 
is engaged in conduct, but it is not the type of conduct that needs to be pro-
tected by the First Amendment.70  Texas v. Johnson explained that only 
conduct performed with the intention of expressing an idea warrants pro-
tection under the First Amendment.71  For instance, a person burning an 
American flag at a political event needs protection because they are en-
gaged in controversial conduct that is sufficiently imbued with the neces-
sary elements of communication to be afforded First Amendment protec-
tion.72  Under the Spence test, a wide range of conduct that is not pure 
speech has been determined to be expressive, such as taping a black peace 
sign to an American flag,73 wearing black arm bands in opposition to the 
war in Vietnam,74 marching peaceably to express grievances against the 
government, protesting discrimination by engaging in sit-ins, refusing to 
salute the American flag, and “parad[ing] with or without banners or writ-
ten messages.”75  
                                                           
67.  White, 560 S.E.2d at 423. 
68.  Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
69.  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
70.  City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). 
71.  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 n.3 (1989). 
72.  See White, 560 S.E.2d at 423 (explaining the Court’s holding in Johnson, 491 U.S. at 
403 n.3).  
73.  See Spence, 418 U.S. at 408–10 (holding that taping a black peace sign to an American 
flag was an expression of anguish about the government’s foreign and domestic policy). 
74.  See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(holding that the state cannot forbid students from wearing black arm bands in protest of the 
Vietnam War).  
75.  Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 694 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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Even though some courts are willing to acknowledge that the tattoo it-
self might be sufficiently imbued with communication, most courts are not 
willing to extend that protection to the actual process of creating tattoos.76  
Courts that separate the process from the product believe that tattooing is 
non-communicative conduct; to them, engrafting a tattoo on the skin does 
not suggest political or social thought to the normal observer, nor does it 
affect public attitudes and behavior.77  Other courts claim that the process 
of creating a tattoo is not an effort to create a particularized message, but 
rather, an attempt to create the expression of the person who is paying for 
the tattoo.78  These courts conclude that tattooing is not speech, symbolic 
speech, or conduct sufficiently communicative to warrant protection by the 
First Amendment.79 
III.  LIKE OTHER ART FORMS AND THEIR PROCESSES, TATTOOS AND 
TATTOOING ARE PURE SPEECH ENTITLED TO FULL PROTECTION UNDER 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Historically, courts that apply the Spence test have offered inconsis-
tent holdings as to whether tattoos and the associated process and business 
of tattooing should be protected by the First Amendment.80  Some courts, 
like the Eighth Circuit, applied the test and found that tattoos—and thus tat-
tooing—are not sufficiently imbued with communicative elements.81  Other 
courts applied the Spence test and found that even though the tattoo might 
encompass communicative elements, the process of tattooing is pure con-
duct without any expressive elements.82  Finally, other courts using the 
Spence test have held that tattooing is expressive conduct entitled to First 
Amendment protection.83  However, the courts need not apply the Spence 
test to tattoos and tattooing because tattoos are pure speech, not expressive 
                                                           
76.  Yurkew, 495 F. Supp. at 1253. 
77.  Id. at 1254–55. 
78.  Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 660. 
79.  See White, 560 S.E.2d at 423 (holding that tattooing is not sufficiently communicative 
to be protected by the First Amendment); see also O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 333 (holding that 
tattooing is not speech or symbolic speech). 
80.  See, e.g., Blue Horseshoe Tattoo, V, Ltd. v. City of Norfolk, 2007 WL 6002098 (Va. 
Cir. Ct. 2007) (reviewing the various court decisions in tattooing cases). 
81.  Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1307 n.4 (8th Cir. 1997). 
82.  See Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (D. Minn. 1980) (providing a list of 
reasons why tattooing is not “sufficiently communicative”). 
83.  See MacNeil v. Bd. of Appeal, No. 02-CV-01225, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 282, at 
*2 (Mass. Super. Aug. 9, 2004) (stating that tattooing was found to be expressive conduct in 
Commonwealth v. Meuse, No. 9877 CR 2644, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 470, at *3 (Mass. Super. 
Nov. 29, 1999) and Lanphear v. Commonwealth, Mem. Decision and Ord., Docket No. 99-1896-
B (Mass. Super. Oct. 20, 2000)).   
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conduct, fully protected under the First Amendment.84  As a result, the 
process that creates the pure speech is protected as well.85     
A.  Tattoos Are Pure Speech  
1.  Tattoos Are an Ancient Art Form Older than the United States Itself  
The history of tattoos precedes the founding of the United States.86  In 
early America, tattoos were viewed as “degraded art”, art for the lower 
classes, and were ridiculed for being “coarse” and “poorly executed” depic-
tions.87  Mostly military men wore tattoos as a symbol of their patriotism.88  
However, by the late 1800’s, tattoo artists began establishing their trade in 
various cities in the United States.89  Famous tattoo artists emerged, such as 
Gus Wagner,90 and advertisements noted that “[t]attooing is quite a fad and 
many ladies as well as gentlemen have adopted it and their persons bear 
everlasting symbols of the art.”91  The acceptance of tattoos in mainstream 
society led to advances in the tattoo industry, such as the invention of the 
first electric tattoo machine in New York City in the 1880s.92  As a result, 
tattoos became more ornate and were less painful to complete.93 
However, the pervasive acceptance of tattooing did not last.94  Con-
servative Americans began to view tattoos as immoral, vile, and appropri-
ate only for the lower class.95  By World War I, the military began to regu-
                                                           
84.  See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that a tattoo is pure speech).  
85.  See id. at 1059 (holding that the Spence test is used when a process does not produce a 
pure expression).  
86.  See Arnold Rubin, General Introduction to MARKS OF CIVILIZATION 13, 14 (Arnold 
Rubin ed., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 1988) (noting that body art was practiced by people of 
Africa, Asia, and the Americans during the Age of Exploration); see also Picchione, supra note 
47, at 832 (noting that tattoos were found on soldiers in the Continental Army). 
87.  Alan Govenar, The Changing Image of Tattooing in American Culture, 1846–1966, in 
WRITTEN ON THE BODY:  THE TATTOO IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 2, at 
212–13. 
88.  Picchione, supra note 47, at 832; see also Govenar, supra note 87, at 213–14 (noting 
that tattoos were so pervasive in the military that by the late nineteen hundreds “95 per cent of the 
26th US infantry and 90 per cent of the sailors serving on American men-of-war were tattooed.”). 
89.  Govenar, supra note 87, at 214. 
90.  Id. at 215 (memorializing Gus Wagner, who traveled around the world studying other 
tattoo artists’ techniques and was known for his great work and skill). 
91.  Id. 
92.  Frederick, supra note 43 at 233; Hedges, supra note 3, at B3. 
93.  Frederick, supra note 43 at 233; Hedges, supra note 3, at B3. 
94.  See Govenar, supra note 87, at 226 (describing the attempt to regulate tattooing). 
95.  Picchione, supra note 47, at 832.   
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late the more sexually suggestive content of tattoos.96  Concurrently, the 
government began inspecting tattoo shops to ensure compliance with health 
codes.97  By the 1950s, journalists lamented that “[t]he venerable art dedi-
cated to skin deep beauty is, unlike its indelible triumphs, fading away.”98  
The post-war society emphasized conformity, and thus tattoos became a 
symbol of adolescent rebellion.99  Once again, tattoos were viewed as an art 
form of the lower class.100   
In the 1960s, an outbreak of Hepatitis in New York was attributed to 
an unsanitary tattoo shop.101  Through the media, word spread that diseases 
could be transmitted through tattooing, and many states and cities reacted 
by banning tattooing completely.102  During the Vietnam War, tattoos 
moved further away from the mainstream when they became a venue for 
anti-war and anti-government expression in the counterculture.103  While 
many older tattoo artists refused to tattoo anti-military images, younger art-
ists quickly embraced the designs of the counterculture and created 
“[p]eace signs, marijuana leaves, mushrooms, swastikas and motorcycle 
emblems . . . .”104 
During the 1970s, traditionally trained fine artists began applying 
their skills to tattooing and created a new genre of tattoos with more so-
phisticated imagery and techniques.105  Contemporary artists such as Bruce 
Nauman, Dennis Oppenheim, and Chris Burden focused their attention on 
creating “body pieces” that “explored ways in which the artist could be-
come both the subject and object” of the artwork.106  Concurrently, younger 
tattoo artists such as Ed Hardy, a student at the San Francisco Art Institute, 
began to establish uniform ethical and hygienic standards in hopes of over-
turning laws that restricted tattooing.107  The self-regulation of tattoo artists, 
                                                           
96.  See Govenar, supra note 87, at 214 (suggesting that this restriction might be a result of 
the more suggestive images of nude women depicted in tattoos during the early twentieth cen-
tury); see also Picchione, supra note 47, at 832 (describing the sexually suggestive tattoos that 
emerged during the early 1900s).   
97.  See Govenar, supra note 87, at 229 (discussing military regulations of tattoos and gov-
ernment inspection of tattoo shops). 
98.  Id. at 230. 
99.  Id. 
100.  Id. (noting that tattoos were associated with “blue-collar workers, drunks, hot rods, 
motorcycle clubs and street gangs”). 
101.  Frederick, supra note 43, at 233. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Picchione, supra note 47, at 833. 
104.  Govenar, supra note 87, at 233. 
105.  Meuse, No. 9877 CR 2644, at *2.  
106.  Govenar, supra note 87, at 233. 
107.  Id. 
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combined with the changing attitudes toward body art, created a platform 
in the 1970s and 1980s that established tattooing as a legitimate art form.108  
By the 1980s, tattoos reached rock star status.109  Musicians and their 
supermodel girlfriends openly displayed their tattoos, and consumer de-
mand for this art form skyrocketed.110  As tattooing again became more ac-
ceptable within mainstream society, states lifted their bans against the 
process of tattooing.111  Today, tattooing has become a leading art form, a 
desirable profession,112 a profitable sector of the national economy,113 and 
the subject of museum exhibits throughout the United States.114  Today, tat-
too artists are known for their “large-scale, unified, custom designs,” and 
some have even sought copyrights for their finished pieces.115  Currently, 
most tattoo artists are graduates of college art programs who seek the “in-
trinsic appeal of the medium” and desire to break free from the “limita-
tions, distortions and irrelevance of conventional elitist modes of art pro-
duction.”116 Tattoos are pervasive; they are found on everyone from 
athletes to movie stars to public figures who shape American culture.117   
 2.  Tattoos, Like All Other Visual Arts, Deserve Protection as Pure Speech  
Although the Supreme Court has never heard a case concerning First 
Amendment protection for visual art, it has held that forms of expression—
such as art, music, and entertainment—are protected under the First 
                                                           
108.  Id. 
109.  See generally Tattoos Leave Mark on Ads, supra note 2, at C8 (describing how tat-
toos have garnered popularity especially among rock stars and movie stars).  
110.  See generally id. (describing the commercial impact of tattoos on advertising).  
111.  See Frederick, supra note 43, at 236 (noting that between 1960 and 2003, statewide 
tattoo bans had been repealed in all states except South Carolina and Oklahoma); see also Janice 
Francis-Smith, OK Governor Henry Signs Tattoo Legalization into Law, J. REC. (Okla. City), 
May 11, 2006 (declaring that Oklahoma was the last state to repeal its ban in 2006, making tat-
tooing legal in all fifty states). 
112.  Meuse, No. 9877 CR 2644, at *3.  
113.  See id. (stating that tattooing “is the sixth-fastest growing retail business in the United 
States [and] [t]he single fastest growing demographic group seeking tattoo services is . . . middle-
class suburban women.”). 
114.  See id. (noting that the American Museum of Natural History in New York City had a 
current exhibit titled, “Body Art:  Marks of Identity” which was attended by many high-profile 
Manhattanites dressed in formal attire and tattoos). 
115.  Arnold Rubin, The Tattoo Renaissance, in MARKS OF CIVILIZATION, supra note 86, 
at 235. 
116.  Id.   
117.  Meuse, No. 9877 CR 2644, at *3. 
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Amendment.118  In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court held 
that the First Amendment protected the music at a concert where there was 
also political speech.119  The Court distinguished the speaker’s political re-
marks from the music to emphasize that the music itself received full First 
Amendment protection “as a form of expression and communication.”120  
The court reasoned that music needs First Amendment protection because 
it is “one of the oldest forms of human expression” that has a long history 
of censorship.121  Likewise, tattooing is one of the oldest forms of human 
expression subjected to censorship by governments in the past, and thus is 
in need of First Amendment protection.122 
 Similarly, in Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, the Supreme Court ruled that 
motion pictures fall within the “ambit of protection which the First 
Amendment, through the Fourteenth, secures to any form of ‘speech’ or 
‘the press.’”123 The First Amendment shelters motion pictures because they 
are a “significant medium for the communication of ideas.”124  The Court 
added that movies are deserving of protection because they have the power 
to affect public attitudes and behavior, from the “espousal of a political or 
social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all ar-
tistic expression.”125  Similarly, tattoos have the power to shape public atti-
tudes and behavior.126  Tattoos are often used as “cultural icon[s]” in adver-
tisements and promotions to attract younger consumers.127  For example, 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company has offered a set of free tires to anyone 
who will tattoo the company’s logo onto his or her body.128  Furthermore, 
the website leaseyourbody.com allows advertisers to find people willing to 
                                                           
118.  See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (holding that motion 
pictures are protected under the First Amendment as a form of “speech”); see also Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (holding that music is protected under the First 
Amendment). 
119.  Ward, 491 U.S. at 790.   
120.  Id. 
121.  See id. (noting that music has been censored since the time of Plato). 
122.  See Jane Caplan, Introduction to WRITTEN ON THE BODY:  THE TATTOO IN 
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 2, at xi–xii (discussing the goal of modern lit-
erature on the history of tattooing to establish tattooing as a legitimate art form as opposed to the 
“dishonorable and penal reputation” it has in Western culture); see also Govenar, supra note 87, 
at 229 (discussing the censorship of tattoos in the military during the second half of the 20th cen-
tury).  
123.  Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 501. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. 
126.  See Tattoos Leave Mark on Ads, supra note 2, at C8 (arguing that the pervasive use 
of tattoos in advertising has made them less effective marketing tools).  
127.  Id. 
128.  Id. 
 
2011] THESE TATS ARE MADE FOR TALKING 189 
 
 
be paid for wearing tattoo advertisements.129  In a more serious context, 
other tattoos express pro-war or anti-war sentiments, such as the soldiers 
during the Vietnam War who tattooed “Sat Cong” (Kill the Communists) 
on themselves before entering combat, or the anti-war protestors who tat-
tooed peace signs on their bodies to oppose the war.130 
Some who oppose granting blanket First Amendment protection to 
tattoos believe that only tattoos making political statements might warrant 
protection.131  For example, in Riggs v. City of Fort Worth, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas stated that a plain-
tiff’s tattoo of a Celtic tribal design was an “artistic expression” as opposed 
to a “political message.”132  As a result, the tattoo did not receive First 
Amendment protection because the tattoo was a way to express a personal 
view and not a matter of “legitimate public concern”.133  However, the Su-
preme Court has held that First Amendment protection is granted not only 
to the discussion of political ideas but also to “philosophical, social, artis-
tic, economic, literary [and] ethical matters.”134  Thus, the First Amend-
ment provides broader protection than that afforded by the Texas District 
Court, and thus, tattoos do not need to be political statements to be pro-
tected by the First Amendment.   
Furthermore, appellate courts have afforded more traditional visual 
arts pure speech status under the First Amendment.135  In White v. City of 
Sparks, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that an artist’s paint-
ing ought to be protected as pure speech under the First Amendment be-
cause it created thoughtful reflection and discussion and because the Su-
preme Court has held that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a 
condition of constitutional protection.”136  Tattoos, like paintings, provoke 
thoughtful reflection and discussion by those who view them.137  Paintings 
                                                           
129.  Id. 
130.  Govenar, supra note 87, at 233. 
131.  See Riggs v. City of Fort Worth, 229 F. Supp. 2d 572, 581 n.11 (N.D. Tex. 2002) 
(hinting that courts might protect tattoos which “state” political messages). 
132.  Id. at 580 n.11. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977). 
135.  See White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that arts and 
entertainment are protected forms of expression, and visual art is included in that category).   
136.  See id. at 956 (illustrating that paintings may express a social position, condemnation 
of foreign policy, demonstrate an artist’s vision of movement and color, or shape public opinion) 
(quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)).  
137.  See Clinton R. Sanders, Drill and Frill:  Client Choice, Client Typologies, and Inter-
actional Control in Commercial Tattooing Settings, in MARKS OF CIVILIZATION, supra note 86, 
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can express a political position, depict a scene in nature, or show deep un-
derstanding of movement and color.138  Nonetheless, courts have found that 
all types of paintings elicit thoughtful reflection and discussion.139  Like-
wise, tattoos can express those same reflections,140 and often become con-
versation pieces when people inquire about the significance of a person’s 
tattoo.141   
Opponents of this view argue that a tattoo is unlike a painting or 
sculpture because a painted canvas or sculpture can be displayed for all to 
see, but a tattoo cannot.142  However, tattoos are constantly viewed by the 
public.143  In fact, tattoos probably receive more viewership than a piece of 
art located in a museum.144  Tattoos are an “intimate art form” that people 
carry on their bodies, thus enabling all people, not just those who pay ad-
mittance to an art museum, to see and understand them.145  Furthermore, 
determining whether protection should be afforded based on visibility to 
the public would result in absurd inconsistencies.  For example, under this 
rule, if a person had the exact same tattoo on the thumb and on the back, 
the visible thumb tattoo would be protected while the other would not.  
Similarly, a painting produced by Jackson Pollock that was hidden in his 
attic would not be protected, but a Pollock painting displayed in a museum 
would receive full First Amendment protection.146  Thus, the amount of 
visibility a piece of artwork receives cannot be determinative of its ability 
to be protected under the First Amendment. 
Others oppose giving First Amendment protection to tattoos because 
tattoos do not convey particularized messages easily understood by their 
viewers.147  For example, the Eighth Circuit declared that a tattoo of a small 
                                                                                                                                        
at 219, 223 (describing why men and women get tattoos in different locations based on others’ 
interpretation of the tattoo). 
138.  White, 500 F.3d at 956.  
139.  Id. 
140.  See Rubin, supra note 115, at 238 (showing a picture of a back tattoo called the 
“Warrior”). 
141.  See Sanders, supra note 137, at 222–23 (describing five reasons why people get tat-
toos and then transcribing a conversation between a tattoo artist and a customer concerning why 
that customer chose a specific tattoo). 
142.  Brief for Appellee at 3, Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051 (2009) 
(No. 08-56914) [hereinafter Brief for Hermosa]. 
143.  See Tattoos Leave Mark on Ads, supra note 2, at C8 (noting that Angelina Jolie, Josef 
Stalin, and Thomas Edison all have/had viewable tattoos).  
144.  Sanders, supra note 137, at 223 (quoting one tattoo artist as saying “nobody ever sees 
[museum art]”). 
145.  Id. 
146.  See White, 500 F.3d at 956 (holding that Jackson Pollock’s paintings are protected 
under the First Amendment).   
147.  See Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1307 n.4 (noting that Stephenson’s tattoo does not con-
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cross located between the thumb and index finger did not convey the requi-
site particularized message and was instead simply “self-expression.”148  
However, later, the court acknowledged that the opposing party viewed the 
cross as a gang symbol and “a significant portion of the world’s popula-
tion” viewed it as a symbol of devotion to the Christian religion.149  The 
Eighth Circuit might not have found that the tattoo conveyed the same 
message to everyone, but it definitely did convey a message.150   
The Supreme Court has held that if First Amendment protection relied 
on the delivery of a particularized message, protection would never have 
been afforded to “unquestionably shielded [speech such as the] painting of 
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of 
Lewis Carroll.”151  As with the subjective message conveyed by a cross tat-
too, two different people might find different messages in Pollock’s Num-
ber 1 located at the Museum of Contemporary Art.152  People may even be-
lieve that there is no message and that the painting is just a self-
expression.153  However, regardless of the meaning others read into his 
work, the work is fully protected by the First Amendment.154  Similarly, 
tattoos convey messages, and although the message a particular tattoo con-
veys may not be consistent or easily understood by all who view it, that is 
not a valid reason to deny the tattoo First Amendment protection.155  
Finally, in Bery v. City of New York, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals protected visual art as pure speech because it is as “wide ranging in 
its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pam-
phlet or other writing . . . .”156  In fact, visual art has the power to convey 
messages to more people since these expressions can transcend language 
barriers and reach those who are illiterate.157  The court concluded that 
                                                                                                                                        
vey a particularized message).  
148.  Id. at 1307 n.4. 
149.  Id. at 1308. 
150.  See id. (noting that the meaning of Stephenson’s tattoo is contested). 
151.  Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.  
152.  See Jackson Pollock “Number 1,” THE MUSEUM OF CONTEMPORARY ART, 
http://www.moca.org/audio/postwar/audio_popup_pollock.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2010) (ex-
plaining the significance of Pollock’s painting). 
153.  See id. 
154.  See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (stating that the First Amendment “unquestionably” pro-
tects Jackson Pollock paintings).  
155.  See Sanders, supra note 137, at 222-23 (describing five reasons why people get tat-
toos).  
156.  Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996). 
157.  Id. 
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“words may form part of a work of art, and images may convey messages 
and stories,” but both forms of expression are protected as pure speech.158  
Similarly, tattoos have the power to convey a wide range of ideas, con-
cepts, and emotions.159  For example, a tattoo of someone’s name can sym-
bolize a close interpersonal relationship, members of a biking group might 
chose to tattoo their club’s insignia on their body, or a person who has re-
cently experienced a traumatic experience might tattoo an image conveying 
the emotions stemming from that experience.160  
B.  The Product of Tattoos and the Process of Tattooing Are Inextricably 
Linked and Thus Protected Under the First Amendment as Pure Speech 
1.  Tattoos Cannot Be Created Without the Process of Tattooing 
The Supreme Court does not treat the process of creating pure speech 
and the product of that process differently when determining whether the 
product and the process should be afforded First Amendment protection.161  
This is because the Court sees the process and the product as inextricably 
intertwined.162  Therefore, any restriction on the process would be an obsta-
cle to the production of the protected expression, thus chilling the free ex-
pression of ideas.163  For example, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. 
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, the Court cautioned against unfairly 
burdening the ink and paper used to create a newspaper for fear that it 
would effectively censor the production of the newspaper.164  Much like a 
newspaper that cannot exist without the ink and paper used to create it, a 
tattoo cannot be created without the process of tattooing.165  For instance, if 
a rural town located 500 miles from a tattoo parlor bans the art of tattooing, 
but not the actual wearing of a tattoo, the town is still effectively banning 
tattoos, because it leaves no legal place within the town for willing citizens 
to produce them.166  
                                                           
158.  Id. 
159.  Sanders, supra note 137, at 222. 
160.  See id. (explaining the various reasons for getting a tattoo).  
161.  Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1061. 
162.  See id. at 1062 (comparing tattooing to writing where the entire purpose of the proc-
ess is to create the final product). 
163.  See generally Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 
U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (holding that a tax on the production of a newspaper can threaten its opera-
tion and in essence censor the press). 
164.  Id.  
165.  Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1062.  
166.  Contra Brief for Hermosa, supra note 142, at 47 (arguing that a city that bans tattoo-
ing does not ban tattoos). 
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Even though opponents acknowledge that a ban on the physical act of 
writing would be the functional equivalent of a restriction on books or on 
written expression in general, they argue that if an author were no longer 
able to write in graphite, that author would instead pick up a pen.167  How-
ever, the same cannot be true of tattooing.  If a tattoo artist were banned 
from using a needle and ink to create a tattoo, the artist would be unable to 
resort to another method to obtain the same result.168  In fact, it is the proc-
ess of puncturing the skin with ink-filled needles that creates the most criti-
cal aspect of the tattoo:  its permanence.169  Everything involved with that 
permanence is what makes the tattoo—the “pain, the scarification, the ex-
hibitionism,”170 the “evocation of the private depths of the self upon the 
surfaces of the body . . . .”171  If tattoo artists are banned from using needles 
and ink, they no longer have a method for producing the tattoo, a perma-
nent marking upon one’s skin.172  
2.  The Only Reason to Undergo the Process of Tattooing Is to Receive a 
Tattoo 
Unlike tattooing, processes that are viewed as not inextricably inter-
twined contain conduct that can be performed without creating the desired 
expression.173  Such symbolic conduct may consist of wearing a black arm-
band or walking in a parade.174  These activities can be done for reasons 
that have no connection to any expression.175  For example, a person might 
wear an armband to prevent sweat from dripping down his or her arm.  In 
this sense, wearing an armband is pure conduct, devoid of any expressive 
meaning.176  However, a person undergoes the process of obtaining a tattoo 
                                                           
167.  Id. at 30. 
168.  See Yurkew, 495 F. Supp. at1252 (noting that tattoos require injecting dye into the 
person’s skin through the use of a needle).   
169.  Benson, supra note 2, at 251. 
170.  Kimmelman, supra note 5, at C1.  
171.  Benson, supra note 2, at 251. 
172.  Kimmelman, supra note 5, at C1 (stating that the uniqueness of tattoos stems from 
their permanence and the control over permanently marking one’s body).   
173.  See State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 423 (S.C. 2002) (explaining when the Spence test 
is used). 
174.  Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1061. 
175.  Id. 
176.  Contra Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (noting that sometimes the 
context surrounding an action gives that action a symbolic meaning; for example, wearing an 
armband within the context of the Vietnam War conveyed an unmistakable message about an is-
sue of intense public concern). 
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in order to permanently express an idea, belief, or feeling on his or her 
body.177  There is never a time when a person is tattooed for any other rea-
son.178  Even the least expressive form of permanent tattooing, cosmetic tat-
tooing, is still a process sought to leave a permanent mark upon the skin of 
a customer.179  These women commission a tattoo artist to create for them 
what they believe is beauty in the most lasting form.180   
Tattooing is not conduct that contains speech; rather, it is more akin 
to the writing process.181  The tattooing process is the only way to create 
the tattoo, just like the writing process is the only way to create the book.182  
For both writing and tattooing, only after hours of planning, thought, and 
work is the final product created in the vision planned by the author and 
editor.183  Just as a book and its author would be protected under the First 
Amendment, so should the tattoo and its artist.184 
C.  The Process of Tattooing, Viewed Separately from the Tattoo, Is 
Expressive Activity 
Under the Spence test, some courts professed that the process of creat-
ing a tattoo is not an effort to create a particularized message, but rather an 
attempt to create the expression of the person who is paying for the tat-
too.185  However, the Supreme Court has held that First Amendment pro-
tection does not “require [the creator] to generate, as an original matter, 
each item featured in the communication” in order to receive First 
Amendment protection.186  If First Amendment protection was only given 
to work that was uninfluenced by another’s creative direction, a mural cre-
ated by Diego Rivera as a result of a government grant would not be pro-
tected because the government was the communicator and not the artist 
                                                           
177.  See Sanders, supra note 137, at 222–23 (presenting five reasons why a person would 
get a tattoo). 
178.  See Kimmelman, supra note 5, at C1 (reporting that tattooing has to do with taking 
liberty over one’s own body). 
179.  See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1065 
(9th Cir. 2003) (describing the types of permanent make-up customers seek). 
180.  See Govenar, supra note 87, at 217 (noting that since the early 1900s, women sought 
permanent make-up to meet the idea of beauty). 
181.  Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1062.  
182.  Id. 
183.  See Sanders, supra note 137, at 221 (detailing the process of tattooing as a time con-
suming, planned activity).   
184.  See Bery, 97 F.3d at 695 (stating that visual artwork is an embodiment of the artist’s 
expression just like a book is the embodiment of the author’s expression).   
185.  Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago, 580 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660 (N.D. Ill. 
2008). 
186.  Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569–71.  
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himself.187  Likewise, a newspaper would not be protected speech because 
individual reporters and editors dictate and edit the content of news sto-
ries.188  Tattooing is similar to a government-sponsored mural or a news 
story written for the Los Angeles Times because, in creating a tattoo, both 
the tattoo artist and the customer contribute their artistic vision to the final 
product.189  The customer enters the tattoo parlor with an idea, but it is the 
artist and his artistic talent that creates the image.190   
Much like a person seeking a commissioned painting, people who de-
sire tattoos seek out certain tattoo artists.191  For example, Ed Hardy, who 
would himself become a famous tattoo artist, sought out Phil Sparrow’s 
studio for his first tattoo, after hearing about his work through Milt Zeis.192  
Later, Hardy flew to Japan to work with and be tattooed by Horihide, a dis-
tinguished Japanese tattoo artist.193  Moreover, like many other art forms, 
the cost of tattoos depends on the time invested to create the work and the 
fame of the artist.194   
In the past, courts have opined that since the tattoo artist has “no con-
trol over the tattoo once its [sic] engrafted on the skin of someone else[,]” it 
becomes the expression of the paying customer, not the artist.195  However, 
the Supreme Court has held that just because a product is produced for 
profit, the creator’s right to protection is not terminated.196  In fact, without 
payment for the final product, most people would not be able to create the 
protected expression.197  For example, although Picasso no longer has con-
trol over “Guernica”, the painting still remains entitled to First Amendment 
                                                           
187.  See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1062 (explaining that even commissioned artwork is enti-
tled to protection). 
188.  Id. 
189.  Id. (stating that tattooing is a collaborative creative process where both the customer 
and the tattoo artist engage in expressive activity). 
190.  See generally Sanders, supra note 137, at 220 (describing the relationship that devel-
ops between that tattoo and the tattoo artist who has the “skill and . . . consequent right to control 
the interaction”). 
191.  See Abowitz, supra note 10, at D10 (referencing a tattoo artist who has a two-year 
waiting list for clients who pay a minimum charge of $10,000 for his work). 
192.  Rubin, supra note 115, at 242. 
193.  Id. at 245. 
194.  See Abowitz, supra note 10, at D10 (reporting that Mario Barth has a two-year wait-
ing list of clients willing to pay $10,000 for a piece of artwork); see also O’Connor, supra note 
41, at 1 (stating that a tattoo can cost between $75 and $70,000). 
195.  Brief for Hermosa, supra note 142, at 4. 
196.  See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C. Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988) (holding 
that a speaker’s rights are not terminated because the speaker is paid to speak).  
197.  Bery, 97 F.3d at 696. 
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protection.198  Similarly, newspapers are protected even after a customer 
purchases them.199  There would be little speech value in newspapers if 
they were never circulated.200   
Furthermore, tattoo artists, like other fine artists or news reporters, 
must be attuned to their customers’ needs.201  They must employ certain 
strategies to instill confidence in their customers to show that their shop has 
the desired level of skill and professionalism.202  Tattoo artists see them-
selves in a customer-oriented business where meeting their clients’ needs 
can result in a profitable business.203  However, they are not willing to sac-
rifice their personal beliefs for a paycheck.204  For example, Big Joe Kap-
lan, a tattoo artist in New York, refuses to tattoo swastikas or a person’s 
face.205  Like other artists, tattoo artists remain true to their art, creating 
pieces that they are proud of and that have the potential to be worth over 
$10,000.206  However, it is important to note that even though tattoo artists 
share many characteristics with other visual artists, First Amendment pro-
tection is not dependent on the price of the art or the values it portrays.207   
IV.  THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SHOULD ESTABLISH FULL 
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR TATTOOS AND TATTOOING 
The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether tattoos or the process 
of tattooing is protected under the First Amendment.208  As a result, differ-
ent courts have found different levels of protection for tattoos and the asso-
                                                           
198.  See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1062 (arguing that Michelangelo’s paintings in the Sistine 
Chapel are no longer in his possession but are still protected). 
199.  See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 768 (1988) (holding 
that the activity of circulating newspapers is protected); see also See Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 
U.S. at 501 (holding that the fact that movies are produced, distributed and exhibited as part of a 
large-scale, for-profit business does not affect their First Amendment protection). 
200.  Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. at 768 (citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 
(1878) and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)). 
201.  See Sanders, supra note 137, at 221 (describing how to interact with an incoming 
customer). 
202.  See id. (describing how to interact with an incoming customer). 
203.  See id. at 222 (describing how tattoo artists see themselves). 
204.  O’Connor, supra note 41, at 1. 
205.  See id. (explaining how tattoo artists can choose to refrain from tattooing certain tat-
toos).  
206.  See Abowitz, supra note 10, at D10 (stating that there is a two-year waiting list to be 
tattooed by Barth at a minimum charge of $10,000). 
207.  See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1062 (arguing that the First Amendment protects a com-
missioned painting completed by Michelangelo which was completed for money and conveyed 
the commissioner’s values).  
208.  Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago, 580 F. Supp. 2d 656, 659 (N.D. Ill. 
2008). 
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ciated process.209  The Supreme Court will review a U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeal’s decision if its ruling conflicts with the ruling of another Court of 
Appeal.210  Here, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling not only conflicts with the 
Eighth Circuit’s prior ruling, but it completely departs from the test the 
Eighth Circuit used to render its decision.211  Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s de-
cision in Anderson creates a conflict that will only generate further uncer-
tainty in the law.  
A.  The Supreme Court Should Grant Certiorari to Anderson v. Hermosa 
Beach to Resolve the Conflict that Exists Between Different Circuits Within 
the United States 
The Ninth Circuit, which held that tattoos, the process of tattooing, 
and the business of tattooing were protected by the First Amendment, did 
not rely upon the Spence Test to reach its decision.212  The essential ele-
ment to the Ninth Circuit’s decision is its belief that tattoos are pure speech 
to be fully protected under the First Amendment to the same extent as a 
piece of artwork or a novel.213  Once tattoos are viewed as pure speech and 
not expressive conduct, the next logical conclusion is that tattooing is so 
intertwined with the creation of the tattoo that it must be afforded full First 
Amendment protection as well.214  Protecting the product without the proc-
ess would make the creation of the product impossible, as most people do 
not have the artistic ability or the pain threshold required to stick a needle 
into their own skin numerous times to create a beautiful image.215   
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit, in a footnote, decided that tat-
toos should not be a protected expression.216  The Eighth Circuit applied 
the Spence test to the tattoo itself, not to the process of tattooing.217  How-
ever, the court did this without providing an adequate explanation as to 
                                                           
209.  See supra, Part III. 
210.  SUP. CT. R. 10a. 
211.  Compare Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1307 n.4 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (using the Spence test to determine if Stephenson’s conduct is protected by the First 
Amendment), with Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that tattooing is a purely expressive activity and entitled to full First Amendment protec-
tion without applying the Spence test).  
212.  Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1059. 
213.  Id. at 1061. 
214.  Id. at 1062. 
215.  See id. (stating that the purpose of tattooing is to produce the tattoos, which cannot be 
created without the tattooing process). 
216.  Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1307 n.4.  
217.  Id. 
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why it applied a test that has only been used to determine whether expres-
sive conduct is entitled to First Amendment protection, rather than applying 
the test for pure speech.218  The Spence test is the appropriate test to apply 
when there is an issue as to whether conduct, like burning a flag or march-
ing in a parade, is sufficiently imbued with communicative elements.219  
However, the test does not apply to situations when speech exists without 
associated conduct.220   
The unexplained footnote was then used in subsequent tattooing cases 
to explain why the process of tattooing was not sufficient to pass the 
Spence test for expressive conduct.221  For example, in Blue Horseshoe Tat-
too, V, Ltd. v. City of Norfolk, the court not only denied First Amendment 
protection to a tattoo itself,222 but also to the process of tattooing.223  How-
ever, courts have not yet explained why the Spence test applies to tattoos or 
the process of the tattooing.   
B.  Although Tattooing Previously Conjured Many Negative Associations, 
These Concerns Are No Longer Realistic 
Tattoos and tattooing have received different treatment than other 
forms of visual art.224  The Court has never been questioned that “the proc-
esses of writing words down on paper, painting a picture, and playing an 
instrument are purely expressive activities entitled to full First Amendment 
protection.”225  However, in cases involving tattoos and First Amendment 
rights, most courts have consistently applied the Spence test.226  This deci-
sion might stem from the courts view of tattoos and tattooing as attracting 
criminal elements, spreading diseases and being created upon an objection-
able medium.227  However, First Amendment protection is meant to protect 
                                                           
218.  Id. 
219.  See State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 423 (S.C. 2002) (noting that the First Amend-
ment protects conduct if it is sufficiently imbued with communicative elements according to the 
Spence test). 
220.  See id. (noting that the Spence test is applied to conduct when that conduct is at is-
sue). 
221.  See Blue Horseshoe Tattoo, V, Ltd. v. City of Norfolk, 2007 WL 6002098, at *2 (Va. 
Cir. Ct. 2007) (reviewing various court decisions in tattooing cases). 
222.  Id. at *2 (discussing Riggs v. City of Fort Worth, 229 F. Supp. 2d 572 (N.D. Tex. 
2002) and Stephenson, 110 F.3d 1303).  
223.  Id. 
224.  Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1061 (noting that the courts typically do not draw “a distinc-
tion between the process of creating . . . pure speech . . . and the product of these processes.”).  
225.  Id. at 1062. 
226.  See Blue Horseshoe Tattoo, V, 2007 WL 6002098, at *1; see also Hold Fast Tattoo, 
580 F. Supp. 2d at 659. 
227.  See People v. O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (N.Y. App. Term 1978) (noting that 
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expressions subject to “prejudices and preconceptions [that] . . . have pro-
found unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance . . . .”228  Without the 
protection of the First Amendment, the tattoo would be eliminated by “leg-
islatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups” under the 
guise of the government’s police power.229  Furthermore, the concerns of 
crime and health are no longer applicable in light of the changes in tattoo-
ing that have evolved in recent years.230   
Tattoos, like a Rembrandt or Picasso, consist of words, images, sym-
bols, or any combination of these to express various messages.231  The only 
difference between a painting and a tattoo is that the tattoo is created on a 
human’s skin instead of on a canvas.232  However, a form of speech cannot 
lose its First Amendment protection solely because of the surface upon 
which it exists.233  It is irrelevant whether a drawing “is engrafted onto a 
person’s skin” or impresses ink upon a canvas; the drawing is still pro-
tected.234  The First Amendment equally protects Henri Matisse’s “The 
First Dance” created with oil paints and canvas, his “The Snail” created 
with gouache on paper, and his “The Back Series” etched out of bronze.235  
However, according to the Eighth Circuit and other district courts, if Ma-
tisse had created any of these works of art by tattooing the human skin, 
they would completely lose all protection solely because of his choice of 
medium.236 
                                                                                                                                        
four Justices of the Appellate Division found tattooing to be “associated with a morbid or abnor-
mal personality”) (quoting Grossman v. Baumgartner, 254 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1964)); see also Golden v. McCarty, 337 So. 2d 388, 390 (Fla. 1976) (noting that because tattoo-
ing punctures the skin numerous times, it creates an “opening . . . for infection and health im-
pairment.”). 
228.  Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 
U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949)).   
229.  Id. 
230.  See Honoré & Atagi, supra note 12, at A1 (describing the court’s opinion in Ander-
son v. City of Hermosa that complete bans on tattoo parlors in municipalities are an “unconstitu-
tional overreaction to health concerns that can be addressed through regulations to ensure sanita-
tion”); see also Body Art:  Tattoos and Piercings, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/Features/BodyArt/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Body 
Art] (listing safety procedures for tattoo shops). 
231.  Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1061.  
232.  Id. 
233.  Id. 
234.  Id. 
235.  See Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 759 F.2d 625, 628–32 (7th Cir. 1985) (declar-
ing that art for art’s sake is protected under the First Amendment). 
236.  See Golden, 337 So. 2d at 391 (stating that the method used for tattooing is sufficient 
to deny tattooing First Amendment protection). 
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Furthermore, courts state that they can draw the line between art upon 
canvas and art tattooed on the human skin because of the associated health 
hazards.237  They believe that “injecting dye” into human skin is so repul-
sive that it must “be subject to state regulation to which other art forms (or 
non-human mediums) may not be lawfully subjected.”238  The process is 
not subjected to a different constitutional standard because it is less com-
municative, but because of the associated health hazards of invading human 
tissue.239  However, even if these health hazards had once been sufficient to 
outweigh the full First Amendment protection of the tattoos’ expression, 
they are no longer categorically so.240   
Tattoo parlors have become a profitable business and thus benefit 
from ensuring customer safety.241  Like all other businesses, tattoo parlors 
are dependent on attracting customers and in order to do so, they must con-
vey to their customers that their methods are safe.242  For this reason, tattoo 
artists will self-regulate by using sterile conditions in order to attract and 
maintain customers.243  Furthermore, as early as 1963, courts have held that 
tattooing can be carried out in a safe and sanitary manner.244  Moreover, 
medical experts believe that safe tattooing procedures can be conducted by 
artists who are required to pass examinations that demonstrate an under-
standing of the principles of bacteriology, sterilization, and asepesis.245  Fi-
nally, sterilized machines and sanitary surroundings can ensure that tattoo-
ing is conducted in a safe manner.246  However, despite acknowledging that 
tattooing can be performed in a safe and sanitary manner, courts still deny 
the same protection afforded to other artwork based upon the use of a proc-
ess that requires “injecting dye into a person’s skin through the use of nee-
dles.”247  Tattooing cannot be both safe and unsafe.  Furthermore, even if 
tattooing does involve some health risks,248 there are hazards in other First 
Amendment activities which allow governments to regulate but not ban the 
                                                           
237.  Id. 
238.  White, 560 S.E.2d at 423.  
239.  Id. 
240.  See Body Art, supra note 230 (listing safety procedures for tattoo shops). 
241.  See Abowitz, supra note 10, at D10 (relaying that “‘tattoo shops make a lot of 
money’” and have “‘incredible profit margins’”).  
242.  See id. (stating that the owner of a tattoo parlor has created an atmosphere in his shop 
that allows people to know it is safe).   
243.  See Govenar, supra note 87, at 233 (noting Ed Hardy’s desire to establish health 
guidelines for tattoo shops).  
244.  Grossman v. Baumgartner, 242 N.Y.S.2d 910, 916 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). 
245.  Id. 
246.  Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (D. Minn. 1980). 
247.  Id. at 1254. 
248.  Body Art, supra note 230. 
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activity.249  For example, paint fumes can be noxious and theatrical per-
formances often involve flammable lighting and other electrical equipment; 
however, these activities cannot be completely suppressed.250   
Crime also seems to be a motivation for denying First Amendment 
protection to tattooing.251  Tattoos have a troubled history; they have been 
associated with criminal activity and delinquent behavior.252  However, 
these accounts no longer accurately describe the demographics of tattoo 
seekers.253  Instead of “servicemen, ex-convicts and members of motorcy-
cle gangs[,]” a growing number of customers at tattoo shops are “teachers, 
nurses [sic] and grandmothers.”254  In fact, tattoos are becoming luxury 
items sought by the country’s elite.255  The changing cultural status of tat-
toos from “that of an anti-social activity in the 1960s to that of a trendy 
fashion statement” calls for a re-evaluation of tattooing because the major-
ity of decisions regarding tattoos relied on decisions made in an “era when 
tattooing was regarded as something of an anti-social sentiment.”256 
V.  FULL FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR TATTOOS AND THE 
PROCESS OF TATTOOING WILL PROHIBIT MUNICIPALITIES FROM 
EFFECTIVELY BANNING TATTOO PARLORS  
If the Supreme Court affirms the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the prod-
uct, process, and business of tattooing will be entitled to full First Amend-
ment protection.257  Whether a business is protected under the First 
                                                           
249.  See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (holding that govern-
ments can impose reasonable restrictions on activities fully protected under the First Amend-
ment). 
250.  See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502–04 (1952) (noting that First 
Amendment protection is not absolute but that there cannot not be a prior restraint on protected 
expression unless there exists extraordinary circumstances). 
251.  See Kennedy v. Hughes, 596 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Del. 1984) (quoting the 
mayor’s statement that “tattooing was inconsistent with the ‘nice family type town’ image of Re-
hoboth Beach”).   
252.  See Clare Anderson, Godna:  Inscribing Indian Convicts in the Nineteenth Century, 
in WRITTEN ON THE BODY:  THE TATTOO IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 2, 
at 102, 106 (tracing the history of the tattoo to ancient cultures that used the tattoo for punitive 
purposes, to mark delinquent slaves and criminals). 
253.  See O’Connor, supra note 41, at 1 (noting the changing demographics of tattoo cus-
tomers). 
254.  Id. 
255.  See Abowitz, supra note 10, at D10 (describing Mario Barth’s shop at Mandalay Bay 
in Las Vegas).   
256.  White, 560 S.E.2d at 425 (Waller, J., dissenting). 
257.  Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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Amendment substantially affects municipal zoning laws since zoning ordi-
nances must conform to the Constitution.258  Like other content-based laws 
that restrict protected expression,259 a zoning law that infringes upon free 
expression is examined under a strict scrutiny, and not a rational basis, 
test.260  On the other hand, laws that are content-neutral are valid regula-
tions of speech only if they are a reasonable “time, place, or manner” re-
striction.261  Currently, courts that deny First Amendment protection to tat-
too parlors apply a rational basis test, where any legitimate purpose for the 
challenged laws render the restriction constitutional.262   
A.  If Not Protected, Tattooing Bans Will Remain Constitutional 
Under the rational basis test, courts have found zoning regulations 
that entirely forbid the act of tattooing within a city or regulations that only 
permit tattooing by or under the direction of a licensed doctor or dentist to 
be constitutional.263  Even ordinances that further limit the process of tat-
tooing by requiring that tattoos only be performed by doctors for cosmetic 
or reconstructive purposes are upheld.264  Under the rational basis test, 
these ordinances have been upheld as a legitimate use of the states’ police 
powers to protect the health, safety, and welfare of would-be tattoo cus-
tomers.265   
The rational basis test is a very deferential test, where a law is pre-
sumed valid unless the ordinance is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.266  
Courts have found that legislatures intended to protect customers from the 
“very real risk of infection or transmission of communicable diseases,” es-
pecially serum hepatitis, by passing laws that severely restrict tattooing.267  
                                                           
258.  Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981). 
259.  See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994) (defining content-
based laws as those that “stifle” speech based on its message or a requirement that a particular 
message be uttered and thus requiring a rigorous scrutiny). 
260.  See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (holding 
that content-based regulations must withstand strict scrutiny) (citing Sable Commc’n of Cal., Inc. 
v. FCC, 492  U.S. 115, 126 (1989); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 1214 (acknowledg-
ing that the distinction between neutral and content-based restrictions affects the outcome of a 
decision). 
261.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
262.  Kennedy v. Hughes, 596 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Del 1984). 
263.  See, e.g., State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 424 (S.C. 2002); Piperato v. Zuelch, 395 
So. 2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
264.  White, 560 S.E.2d at 421. 
265.  Id. at 424. 
266.  Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago, 580 F. Supp. 2d 656, 662 (N.D. Ill. 
2008) (citing Clark v. County of Winnebago, 817 F.2d 407, 408 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
267.  State ex rel. Med. Licensing Bd. v. Brady, 492 N.E.2d 34, 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
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Although courts have found this purpose to be legitimate,268 this restriction 
on tattooing does not appear to be logical.  In fact, courts have upheld bans 
on tattoo parlors for the safety of the public even when they found that a 
tattoo shop employed “extensive sterilization procedures” and would not 
create a risk of infection.269   
Furthermore, courts such as the Supreme Court of New York have 
conceded that legislatures have failed to offer a reasonable purpose for 
complete bans on tattooing, stating that banning tattooing “bear[s] no rea-
sonable relation to the protection of the public health against the contagion 
of serum hepatitis.”270  Unfortunately, the denial of First Amendment pro-
tection to tattoos sacrifices the tattoo artists’ “right to engage in tattooing” 
in order to allegedly protect “the public’s right to good health.”271 
B.  If Full Protection Is Awarded to Tattoos and Tattooing, Most Zoning 
Laws Banning Tattoo Parlors Will Be Declared Unconstitutional 
1.  Content-Based Anti-Tattoo Parlor Laws Must Withstand Strict Scrutiny 
 Although zoning laws banning tattoo parlors appear neutral on their 
face, those that ban tattooing by anyone other than a doctor or dentist can 
be effectively categorized as content-based restrictions on free speech.272  
Doctors and dentists are not artists and thus cannot create the works of art 
for which people seek tattoo artists.273  Instead, the only tattoos permitted 
would be those for cosmetic or reconstructive surgery.274  For example, a 
dermatologist would be able create permanent markings of lipstick, eye-
liner, and eyebrows for his patients.275  However, this would result in a 
complete ban of all tattoos done for artistic or communicative purposes.276  
These ordinances would not allow a tattoo artist, even one who completed 
the rigorous coursework to become a doctor, to be able to practice his ex-
pressive art.277  He would only be allowed to tattoo for cosmetic or recon-
                                                           
268.  Kennedy, 596 F. Supp. at 1494. 
269.  Brady, 492 N.E.2d at 39.  
270.  Grossman v. Baumgartner, 242 N.Y.S.2d 910, 913 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). 
271.  People v. O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (N.Y. App. Term 1978). 
272.  See Kennedy, 596 F. Supp. at 1495 (holding that a plaintiff who followed sanitary 
procedures could still be denied the ability to operate a tattoo parlor). 
273.  Golden v. McCarty, 337 So. 2d 388, 391 (Fla. 1976) (Sundberg, J., dissenting). 
274.  White, 560 S.E.2d at 426 (Waller, J., dissenting). 
275.  Gina Piccalo, Botox, This Is Your Big Week, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at E1.   
276.  Golden, 337 So. 2d at 391 (Sundberg, J., dissenting).  
277.  White, 560 S.E.2d at 426 (Waller, J., dissenting). 
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structive purposes.278  Thus, these statutes ban tattoos that express mes-
sages and ideas that were typically associated with an underclass, but not 
tattoos that people obtain in order to compete within a society that values a 
certain idea of beauty.279  
Laws which are content-based would “require[] the government to 
prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that interest.’”280  Although a court would likely find the 
protection of the general public from communicable diseases a compelling 
interest,281 the same court would likely hold that the means to achieve that 
interest are not narrowly tailored.  Tattoo artists can be trained to use safety 
precautions and prevent the transmission of diseases.282  The narrowest 
means to achieve the compelling interest would be to either require tattoo 
artists to attend medical training where they could learn how to prevent the 
transmission of communicable diseases or to require government monitor-
ing of tattoo parlors’ health and safety techniques.283  In conclusion, ordi-
nances permitting only medical practitioners to tattoo would be declared 
unconstitutional as a “complete ban on the right of free speech.”284 
2.  Content-Neutral Zoning Laws Banning Tattoo Parlors Must Meet the 
Time, Place, and Manner Test for Regulations of Protected First 
Amendment Speech 
Laws that completely ban tattooing are content-neutral since they 
seek to eliminate all types of tattooing within their municipalities.285  Laws 
that restrict a means of expression, not the content, are constitutional only 
if they are reasonable “time, place, [and] manner” restrictions.286  A rea-
sonable time, place, and manner restriction is one that is “justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech, []narrowly tailored to 
                                                           
278.  Id. 
279.  See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 641 (holding that content-based laws are 
those that the government passes because it agrees or disagrees with the message being commu-
nicated); see also Piccalo, supra note 275, at E1.   
280.  Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to 
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). 
281.  Brady, 492 N.E.2d at 39. 
282.  See Golden, 337 So. 2d at 391 (Sundberg, J., dissenting) (observing that there is “no 
reasonable relation between health hazards associated with tattooing and the limitation of its per-
formance to those licensed to practice medicine . . . .”). 
283.  Kennedy, 596 F. Supp. at 1495.  
284.  White, 560 S.E.2d at 426 (Waller, J., dissenting). 
285.  See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 643 (stating that “laws that confer benefits 
or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most in-
stances content neutral”). 
286.  Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1064. 
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serve a significant governmental interest, and []leaves open ample alterna-
tive channels for communication of the information.”287  
Total bans on tattooing would survive the first element of this test be-
cause the bans restrict all tattooing regardless of the content; however, the 
second element might not be met.  On one hand, states could argue that 
complete bans are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government in-
terest.  The state could argue that the injection of ink-filled needles into a 
person’s skin for any reason brings about too great a risk to the public that 
it must be completely eradicated from a city, regardless of the operator of 
the needle.288  On the other hand, these ordinances might not be narrowly 
tailored since they are broader than necessary to achieve the government 
interest.289  Studies show that complete bans on tattoo parlors push tattoo-
ing underground where the tattoo artist is not held to any state-mandated 
health or safety standards.290  A total ban on tattooing would result in a law 
that prohibits not just “unsanitary and unsterile tattooing,” but all types of 
tattoo shops no matter how safe and sterile those establishments may be.291  
Surely, there are better methods to control the public health hazards in-
volved in tattooing other than a complete ban.292  For example, regulations 
requiring tattooing to be performed in a sanitary manner would accomplish 
the states’ purpose without eliminating the practice altogether.293 
Finally, these restrictions would not leave open an alternative form of 
similar communication.294  As discussed above, the tattoo is a unique ex-
pression because it is an “intimate art form” that can be carried on a per-
son’s body for life.295  In fact, part of the appeal of expressing oneself 
through a tattoo instead of a painting or sculpture is that paintings and 
sculptures are commodities that can be bought and sold, whereas tattoos 
permanently belong to their owner and can never be removed by a bank re-
claiming debt or a government foreclosure.296  Since there is no other way 
                                                           
287.  Id. (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
288.  See Golden, 337 So. 2d at 391 (Sundberg, J., dissenting) (contemplating that an abso-
lute prohibition on tattooing might be what the public health hazards require). 
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to permanently mark oneself, these laws would not stand the reasonable 
time, place, and manner restriction.   
However, ordinances that allowed tattoo shops in business districts 
but not in residential districts would most likely be upheld as constitutional 
because they would satisfy the time, place, and manner analysis.297  Like 
total bans, partial bans would apply to all tattoos regardless of the content.  
They would also be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government in-
terest.  For example, the government interest might be to prevent high traf-
fic flow in a residential area.298  Thus, preventing the establishment of tat-
too shops on smaller residential streets would satisfy that government goal.  
Furthermore, unlike total bans, partial bans would leave open alternative 
channels for communication because tattooing would be allowed in busi-
ness and retail areas.   
Furthermore, ordinances like the one in Anderson v. City of Hermosa 
Beach would also be declared unconstitutional.  These ordinances would 
constitute a prior restraint on protected speech and would be subject to 
even stricter constitutional review than the time, place, and manner analy-
sis.299  The prior restraint analysis holds that “licensing or permitting 
scheme[s] which place[] unbridled discretion in the hands of government 
official[s] or agenc[ies] . . . [or] that are impermissibly vague and that fail 
to provide ‘narrow, definite and objective’ standards” are facially unconsti-
tutional.300  Under this analysis, a zoning ordinance that required that a 
conditional use permit for a tattoo parlor be granted only if the specific site 
was “‘an appropriate location for such [a] use’ and . . . [the use] will ‘not 
adversely affect the neighborhood[]’” would be considered too subjec-
tive.301  It would leave the decision to grant or deny the permit to the city 
officials.302  Furthermore, ordinances that give city officials the discretion 
to determine if a tattoo shop in an area will be in the “best interests of the 
community” or for the “public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good 
order, morals, or conscience” are also unconstitutionally vague and thus not 
                                                                                                                                        
one’s death); see also Kimmelman, supra note 5, at C1. 
297.  See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1064 (explaining that only laws that are reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions are constitutional). 
298.  See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (recognizing that state in-
terests in traffic safety may justify zoning regulations). 
299.  MacNeil v. Bd. of Appeal, No. 02-CV-01225, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 282, at *16 
(Mass. Super. Aug. 9, 2004).   
300.  Voigt v. City of Medford, No. 2005-00163F, 2007 Mass. Super. LEXIS 38, at *7–8 
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permitted under the prior restraint analysis.303 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 First Amendment jurisprudence is an ever-expanding category.  
Courts have granted First Amendment protection to the most unlikely types 
of speech, such as soundless and wordless parade marching.304  This is be-
cause our nation is committed to protecting speech regardless of the mes-
sage conveyed.305  However, up until the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, courts, for the most part, 
have failed to protect an ancient form of speech:  tattoos and tattooing.306  
As a result, legislative zoning ordinances that restrict tattooing only to doc-
tors or complete legislative bans have been held constitutional by district 
and appellate courts.307   
 However, these courts have erred in their application of First 
Amendment principles to the issue of tattoos and tattooing.  “The Constitu-
tion looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression.”308  
In fact, the Constitution protects, as pure speech, all forms of artistic ex-
pression.309  Tattoos are an art form and are thereby entitled to full First 
Amendment protection.310  Furthermore, tattoos and tattooing are inexpli-
cably linked, such that any restriction of the process will effectively chill 
the protected expression.311  With full protection for tattoos and tattooing, 
legislatures will no longer be able to eliminate this valuable mode of com-
munication from their municipalities.  Once tattoos and tattooing are fully 
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protected, laws restricting or banning tattoo parlors will be examined with 
stricter scrutiny.312  As a result, state legislatures will not be able to chill 
this tool of permanent self-expression.313 
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